Prologue: The "Spear" on the Loess Plateau
On August 6, 2024, at 2:42 pm. Shanxi Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center.
In the midst of summer, the yellow soil around the launch site was baked white by the scorching sun. In the air filled with static electricity and a sense of anxiety, a Long March 6A carrier rocket ignited with a loud bang. Accompanied by a trembling low-frequency roar, the rocket tore through the atmosphere, leaving a white trail in the sky.
In the official press release, this is a standard and unsurprising successful launch: "China has successfully launched the Qianfan Polar Orbit 01 satellite into orbit, and the satellite has successfully entered the predetermined orbit
But in the secretive world of China's commercial aerospace, the significance of this day is no less than D-Day in 1944.
The 18 flat satellites loaded in the fairing belong to a massive project called the "Thousand Sail Constellation" (G60). Before that, China's ten thousand low orbit broadband Internet constellations only existed in thick application documents, the PPT of VC institutions and numerous disputes in closed meetings.
But from this moment on, the Chinese version of "Starlink" officially jumped from PPT into low Earth orbit.
The insertion of these 18 satellites into orbit is like a depth charge dropped on a calm lake. If you are currently in a satellite factory in Songjiang, Shanghai, or on Rocket Street in Yizhuang, Beijing, you will hear an engine roar that is almost about to erupt at this moment - it is the breathing of the entire industry chain under extreme pressure.
Why now?
If you ask an aerospace engineer, he will tell you that it is because liquid rocket technology has finally converged; If you ask investors, they will say that the policy trend of "new quality productivity" has arrived. But behind these obvious reasons, there are several colder and more urgent timelines hidden.
Commercial aerospace did not suddenly become popular, but rather the four timelines of "policy, technology, resources, and competition" were aligned at the same time between 2024-2026 due to coincidence and inevitability.
This creates a fleeting window period. For China, this is not a romantic poem about the "stars and sea", but a life and death speed of "if missed, there will be none".
First reason: The "Sword of Damocles" above the head - about the seven-year limit of orbit and spectrum
The least sexy and most difficult logic for the public to understand in commercial aerospace is often the most fatal.
In the perception of ordinary people, space is infinitely vast, how can it be crowded? But for radio engineers, low Earth orbit (LEO) and spectrum resources are even scarcer than the land within Beijing's Second Ring Road.
This scarcity is locked in by both physical laws and international regulations.
1. The cruel game of "first come, first served"
The "God" in charge of the global space order is called the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). In the face of increasingly crowded space, ITU has established a simple and ruthless rule: "declare first, launch first, occupy first".
This is like a global 'enclosure movement'. You can draw a circle on the map and say that this piece of land belongs to me. But ITU has established a strict activation mechanism - BIU (Bring Into Use).
From the moment you submit your constellation declaration document (API) to ITU, a countdown clock starts ticking:
You must launch the first satellite and successfully activate the declared frequency within 7 years.
You must complete 10% of the total declared satellite deployment before the end of the 9th year.
You must complete 50% before the 12th year; Complete 100% before the 14th year.
What if it can't be done? Sorry, your declaration documents will be invalidated directly. The spectrum and orbit positions that originally belonged to you will be instantly reclaimed by the country (usually the United States) ranked after you.
2. 2027: Unbreakable 'Deadline'
Let's turn our attention to China. Currently, China has applied for two mega constellation plans with ITU:
GW constellation (State Grid/China Star Network):
The declared quantity is about 13000 pieces, mainly covering the Ka/V frequency band.
G60 constellation (Qianfan):
The planned quantity is about 14000, including a large amount of Q/V frequency band resources.
Most of these grand declaration tasks were completed around 2020 to 2021. Even some early declarations are approaching the deadline.
Take out your calculator and calculate, and you will discover an astonishing fact: 2027 is the insurmountable 'seven-year itch'.
To preserve these precious orbital resources, we must reverse the timeline:
In 2027
Large scale in orbit verification and frequency band activation must be completed.
In 2026
We must enter a high-frequency transmission mode like a dumpling, shifting from simple technical verification to actual constellation networking.
2024-2025
The initial launch verification must be completed to streamline the entire process of satellite manufacturing and rocket launch.
That's why 2024 must be 'moving'. Because if we don't move this year and test again next year, when we plan to launch on a large scale in 2026, we will find that our production capacity cannot keep up, ultimately leading to a default in 2027.
3. Strategic anxiety of "maintaining frequency and occupying track"
An internal industry report once bluntly pointed out that after 2026, the core mission of China's commercial aerospace will shift from "technology verification launch" to "frequency maintaining orbit occupying launch".
This is not a business multiple-choice question, it is a strategic must answer question.
In the radio spectrum, the Ku and Ka frequency bands have been almost snatched up, and now the focus of competition has shifted to the Q/V frequency band. This is an invisible 'highland battle'. If our generation hasn't installed satellites, the next generation may not even have a ticket to 6G communication.
So, the current sense of urgency does not come from insufficient market demand, but from the fear of 'if we don't occupy now, we won't have a place to spend even if we have money in the future'.
Second reason: the violent aesthetics of industrialization - the technological leap from "Ferrari" to "Toyota"
In the past 30 years, the reason why commercial aerospace has become difficult is not only in China, but also in numerous cases of failure worldwide (such as the bankrupt Motorola Iridium project in the 1990s).
The reason for failure is only one word: expensive.
Space exploration in the old era was a 'noble movement'. But this time is different. In 2024, China's aerospace industry is undergoing a genetic mutation from a "handmade workshop" to an "industrial assembly line".
1. Satellite: Building satellites like making mobile phones
At the G60 Satellite Digital Factory in Songjiang, Shanghai, you will see a scene that goes against traditional aerospace knowledge.
In the past, building a satellite required a group of top doctors, wearing almost dust-free protective clothing, and surrounding the satellite like polishing handicrafts, which took six months or even a year. Each satellite is a unique 'Ferrari', and in the event of a malfunction, the entire project will be restarted.
But at the G60 factory, it's more like a Tesla Gigafactory.
Pulsating production line
The satellite is placed on an AGV (Automated Guided Vehicle) and circulates between different workstations. This workstation loads solar panels, and the next workstation tests attitude control.
COTS (Commercial Off the Shelf)
This is the core of cost reduction. Previously, satellites used aerospace grade chips, with one chip costing tens of thousands, which were radiation resistant but had outdated performance; Nowadays, a large number of industrial and even automotive grade components are widely used, designed through "software redundancy" - using three cheap chips as backups for each other, with one broken chip and two more, but the total cost is less than one tenth of aerospace grade chips.
The data is astonishing: the production capacity of this factory has reached 1.5 days to produce one satellite offline. The future goal is to produce one per day. The cost of a single star has been directly reduced from the traditional "billion level" to "tens of millions" or even "millions".
When satellites become consumables, the first button of the commercial loop is fastened.
2. Rocket: The "Chinese version of Falcon" evolving in explosions
The satellite has become cheaper, but the shipping cost (rocket launch) is still too expensive. It's now the turn of Chinese private rocket companies to make their debut.
On June 30, 2024, a famous "accident" occurred in Gongyi, Henan. During a static ignition test, the "Tianlong-3" rocket of Tianbing Technology broke free from the test bench due to excessive thrust and structural failure at the connection. It flew into the sky like a real missile and eventually crashed in the nearby mountainous area.
Although it was an accident, in the eyes of space observers, it is a 'positive signal'.
Why? Because "Tianlong-3" is a large liquid rocket with a diameter of 3.8 meters and a takeoff thrust of 590 tons, it directly competes with SpaceX's Falcon 9. Daring to conduct such high-risk full system tests indicates that Chinese private rockets have bid farewell to the stage of relying on "solid small rockets" to deceive financing in the early years, and have begun to confront the toughest bone of "high thrust+liquid+recyclability" head-on.
At the same time, Blue Arrow Aerospace's "Zhuque-3" completed VTVL-1 (vertical takeoff and landing) tests on the Gobi Desert, achieving hovering and soft landing at the hundred meter level.
Four technological curves will mature simultaneously in 2024:
Liquid oxygen methane engine
Solved the problem of coking in kerosene engines and is the best fuel for rocket reuse. China is even in the top tier of the world in this field (represented by Blue Arrow and Star Glory).
Stainless steel/3D printing manufacturing
The number of engine components has been reduced by 80%, transforming rockets from "precision instruments" to "industrial structural components".
Sea Launch Technology
Eastern Space and other companies have verified sea launches, solving the problems of safety and limited frequency in inland launch sites.
Reuse algorithm
After a lot of trial and error, the control algorithm finally began to converge.
The conclusion is simple: it's not that rockets suddenly become more advanced, but that the cost curve has finally been broken. Once these liquid rockets are put into orbit and reused by 2025-2026, the cost of commercial launches in China is expected to drop to $3000-4000 per kilogram or even lower.
Third reason: Awakening of Party A - the role of the state changes from "nanny" to "customer"
If there is technology and demand, why hasn't it been achieved before? Because the business model is not closed loop.
In the traditional Chinese aerospace system, the state serves as both a referee and an athlete, as well as the sole audience. Private enterprises can only act as peripheral subcontractors if they want to enter. But in 2024, the balance of roles has undergone a qualitative tilt - the country is becoming the largest "first party" in commercial aerospace.
1. The "Second Workstation" in Wenchang, Hainan
If you go to Wenchang, Hainan, besides the famous national launch site, you will find a brand new "Hainan Commercial Space Launch Site" standing next to it.
In June 2024, the second launch station was completed. The significance of these towers is extraordinary.
Previously, private rocket companies had to borrow national facilities from Jiuquan and Taiyuan to launch. Not only do we have to go through layers of approval, but we also have to look at the face of the national mission - if we encounter the Shenzhou manned or military satellite launch, private companies will have to queue indefinitely.
Now, the country has specially built a field for you to use. The second workstation is a "universal workstation" specially designed for various private liquid rockets. This is a form of 'equal rights' at the infrastructure level.
2. From "subsidy" to "procurement"
The deeper change lies in the way money is given.
Old model (traditional aerospace): cost markup. The country gives you a task, how much money do you spend, and the country reimburses you plus 5% profit. The result is that companies don't care about costs at all, they only care about avoiding accidents, the more expensive the better.
New model (commercial aerospace): government procurement services. The country no longer buys rockets, but instead buys' transport capacity '; No longer buying satellites, but buying 'data'.
The release of documents such as the "Action Plan for Promoting High Quality and Safe Development of Commercial Aerospace (2025-2027)" is actually a systematic replication of SpaceX's successful path in the United States: NASA fed SpaceX with orders through the COTS (Commercial Orbital Transport Services) program that year; Now, the Chinese government is also preparing to feed China's SpaceX through orders.
3. The baton of capital
At the same time, the logic of the capital market has also changed. A few years ago, VC was involved in the investment, but now it's the "national team LP" entering the field.
The "South Arrow" in Beijing, the "G60" in Shanghai, and the "Wenchang Valley" in Hainan have all introduced industrial plans worth billions of yuan by local governments. Commercial aerospace has been officially classified as a 'new quality productivity'. This means that it is no longer a "supplementary force" for the space agency, but a new artery that must run through the national economic map, and is the "number one project" for local governments to attract investment.
When the country transforms from a "regulator" to the "largest angel investor" and "largest customer", the flywheel of commercial aerospace truly begins to rotate.
Fourth reason: The elephant in the room - the suffocating pressure brought by SpaceX
If there are only the above three points, China's commercial aerospace industry may steadily advance at its own pace, perhaps in five years, perhaps in ten years.
But the presence of that man across the Pacific turned everything into 'forced acceleration'. The existence of SpaceX has made Chinese astronauts feel an unprecedented sense of suffocation.
1. Quantitative violence
When you read this sentence, there are already over 6000 Starlink satellites hovering above your head. Musk's goal is 42000.
What is this concept? All the satellites launched in human history combined are not as many as SpaceX has launched in a few years.
2. Shadow of "Star Shield"
What's even more terrifying is not broadband internet access, but Starshield.
In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the military potential shown by Star Chain has made the global defense departments sweat hard:
Anti-interference ability
Traditional electronic interference is almost ineffective for distributed networks consisting of thousands of satellites.
Low latency control
It has turned drone warfare into a real-time interactive online game.
Global reconnaissance
Every satellite can be a potential 'sky eye'.
If China does not have its own low Earth orbit constellation, we may face an extreme disadvantage of "one-way information transparency" in certain specific regions in the future. Opponents can see you, but you can't see them, and you can't even connect to the internet.
3. Starship's Dimension Reduction Strike
At present, the launch cost of Falcon 9 has left competitors desperate, but SpaceX still holds a trump card in its hands - Starship.
Although it is still exploding time and time again, each explosion is iterating. Once the starship matures, it can send hundreds of satellites into space at once, reducing costs by an order of magnitude.
If the current Falcon 9 is firing machine guns, then starships are carpet bombing heavy bombers.
This brings about an extreme 'strategic anxiety':
If China cannot establish its own basic constellation architecture before the starship fully matures (expected by 2025-2026), then when the starship starts operating at full speed, the low orbit space will be rapidly filled in a "violent aesthetic" way.
This is like the artificial creation of the "Kessler effect" - when the orbit is filled with other people's satellites, you can't even find the launch window. This is not only commercial competition, but also a "heavenly power theory" similar to the "sea power theory".
So, China must establish its own 'Great Wall of Space' in 2024-2026. This is not a matter of whether you want to do it or not, it is a matter of 'getting out if you don't do it'.
Conclusion: The 'Extra Time' of Great Power Game
Pinching these four lines together, we finally see the true face of the 2024-2026 time window.
This is not only the entrepreneurial story of a few private entrepreneurs, but also not just a speculative topic in the mouths of investors. This is a precise calculation of the national will.
Watch the time of day
The rules of ITU are like a sword of Damocles, forcing us to submit our papers before 2027;
Look at the geographical location
China's powerful industrial manufacturing capabilities and infrastructure maniac attributes have finally overflowed into the aerospace field, turning satellites into a cabbage price;
Look at people and
From the central to the local level, from policies to funding, the entire system's power is mobilized to endorse the same goal.
Look at the opponent
The rapid advance of SpaceX completely dispelled our illusion of "taking it slow".
After the roar of the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center, China's commercial aerospace industry has no way out.
If we win this battle, we will have our own space Internet, a low orbit voice equal to that of the United States, and even the birth of the next Huawei or Dajiang.
If we lose, we will have to accept the fate of being marginalized in the future space economy, watching the starry sky above us become someone else's backyard.
Now, the countdown has begun.
